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Abstract
Recent rapid development of machine learning is largely due to algorithmic break-
throughs, computation resource development, and especially the access to a large
amount of training data. However, though data sharing has the great potential of
improving machine learning models and enabling new applications, there have
been increasing concerns about the privacy implications of data collection. In this
work, we present a novel approach for training differentially private data generator
G-PATE. The generator can be used to produce synthetic datasets with strong
privacy guarantee while preserving high data utility. Our approach leverages gen-
erative adversarial nets (GAN) to generate data and protect data privacy based on
the Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles (PATE) framework. Our approach
improves the use of privacy budget by only ensuring differential privacy for the
generator, which is the part of the model that actually needs to be published for
private data generation. To achieve this, we connect a student geneartor with an
ensemble of teacher discriminators. We also propose a private gradient aggregation
mechanism to ensure differential privacy on all the information that flows from
the teacher discriminators to the student generator. We empirically show that
the G-PATE significantly outperforms prior work on both image and non-image
datasets.
1 Introduction
Machine learning has been applied to a wide range of applications such as face recognition [22],
autonomous driving [18], and medical diagnoses [7, 16]. However, most of them rely on the
availability of large scale training datasets containing sensitive information such as personal photos or
medical records. Therefore, such sensitive datasets are often hard to obtain due to privacy concerns.
To protect privacy information from being leaked, data providers sometimes release synthetic datasets
produced by generative models learned on the original data. Recent studies have shown that generative
models such as generative adversarial networks (GAN) [14] can generate synthetic records that are
indistinguishable from the original data.
Although using synthetic data can prevent machine learning models from directly accessing the
sensitive data, there is no theoretical guarantee on the privacy protections. While privacy definitions
such as differential privacy (DP) [9] and Renyi differential privacy (RDP) [19] provide rigorous
privacy guarantee, applying them to synthetic data generation has shown to be a challenging task.
Recently, two approaches have been proposed to combine differential privacy with GAN. In DP-
GAN [26], the discriminator is trained with differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-
SGD), and the privacy guarantee for the generator is ensured by the post processing property [10] of
differential privacy. However, experimental results have shown that DP-GAN incurs huge utility loss
on the synthetic data, especially when the privacy budget is low (ε ≤ 1).
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PATE-GAN [27] trains differentially private GAN using the PATE mechanism [20]. A student
discriminator is trained with an ensemble of teacher discriminators. To ensure differential privacy,
the student discriminator is not allowed to see any real data. Instead, it is only trained on records that
are produced by the generator and labeled by teacher discriminators. Theoretically, the generator
in GAN has the potential of generating an universal distribution, which is a superset of the real
distribution, so it is not necessary for the student discriminator to be trained on real records. However,
such a theoretical bound is loose. In practice, if a generator does generate enough samples from the
universal distribution, there would be a convergence issue. On the other hand, when the generator
does converge, it no longer covers the universal distribution, so the student generator may fail to learn
the real distribution without seeing real records.
In this paper, we propose a new approach for training a differentially private data generator by
combining GAN framework with the PATE mechanism. Our approach is based on the following key
observation: It is not necessary to ensure differential privacy for the discriminator in order to train a
differentially private generator. As long as we ensure differential privacy on the information flow from
the discriminator to the generator, it is sufficient to guarantee the privacy property for the generator.
Therefore, instead of focusing on ensuring differential privacy for the whole GAN framework, we
design a novel framework to guarantee that all information flowed from the discriminator to the
generator satisfies differential privacy.
Compared to PATE-GAN, our approach has two advantages. First, we improve the use of privacy
budget by applying it to the part of the model that actually needs to be released for data generation.
Second, our discriminator can be trained on real data because itself does not need to satisfy differential
privacy.
Contributions. The primary contribution of this paper is a novel approach for differentially private
data generation. The approach trains a student data generator based on the aggregated information
provided by teacher discriminators. Unlike PATE-GAN [27] and DPGAN [26], the output of our
approach is a differentially private generator rather than an entire GAN, given the fact that the
generator is always the only part to be published for data generation.
To pass information from the teacher discriminators to the student generator, we propose a private
gradient aggregation mechanism based on PATE [20]. The mechanism takes in the gradient vectors
generated by each teacher discriminators and generates a privately aggregated gradient vector from
which the student generator learns how to update its synthetic samples. To take advantage of the
PATE aggregation mechanism [21], we discretize the gradient into several equally sized bins along
each dimension and have teacher discriminators vote for the bins their gradient vectors fall into. We
theoretically prove that our algorithm ensures differential privacy for the generator.
To save privacy budget, the aggregation mechanism uses random projection to reduce dimensions
of gradient vectors. Before aggregation, it projects the vectors onto a lower-dimension space with a
generated projection matrix. The vectors are projected back to the original space after the aggregation.
We conduct extensive experiments on the standard Kaggle credit card fraud detection dataset, as well
as two image datasets MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. We empirically show that G-PATE significantly
outperforms all baselines including DP-GAN and PATE-GAN in terms of data utility.
2 Related Work
Proposed by Dwok et al., differential privacy [8] formalizes the vague concept of privacy into a
provable property. Following this work, researchers have proposed different methods to design
differentially private statistical functions and machine learning models [2, 5, 1, 17, 12]. Recently,
various approaches have been proposed for differentially private data generation. Priview [23]
generates synthetic data based on marginal distributions of the original dataset, and PrivBayes [28]
trains a differentially private Bayesian network. However, these approaches are not suitable for image
datasets since the statistics they use cannot well preserve the correlations between pixels in an image.
Both DP-GAN [26] and PATE-GAN [27] apply differential privacy to the training process of genera-
tive adversarial networks (GAN). They both ensure differential privacy while training the discrim-
inator, and the privacy property of the generator is guaranteed by the post processing property of
differential privacy [10]. Different from their approaches, G-PATE improve the use of privacy budget
2
Student Data 
Generator
Sensitive Data
Data 1
Data 2
Data n
...
Data 3
Teacher 1
Teacher 2
Teacher 3
...
Teacher n
Differentially 
Private Gradient 
Aggregator 
Teacher
Discriminators
Adversarial 
Perturbations
Synthetic Samples
Data Flow Training Gradient
Accesible by Adversary Not Accesible by Adversary
Figure 1: Model Overview of G-PATE. The model contains three parts: a student data generator, a
differentially private gradient aggregator, and an ensemble of teacher discriminators.
by only ensuring differential privacy on the generator, which is the part that actually needs to be
released for synthetic data generation. This improvement allows us to incur lower utility loss on the
synthetic data under the same privacy constraint.
Private aggregation of teacher ensembles (PATE) is a method to train a differentially private classifier
using ensemble mechanisms. It first trains an ensemble of teacher models on disjoint subsets of the
sensitive training data. Then, a differentially private student model is trained on public data labeled by
the teacher models. The privacy guarantee of PATE is more intuitive to understand because no teacher
model can dictate the training of the student model. PATE also benefits from a tighter data-dependent
privacy bound especially when teacher models are likely to reach consensus. Scalable PATE [21]
improves the utility of PATE with a Confident-GNMax aggregator that only returns a result if it has
high confidence in the consensus among teachers. However, both PATE and Scalable PATE relies on
the availability of public unlabeled data, and their aggregators are only applicable to categorical data
(i.e., class labels). On the contrary, G-PATE does not rely on any public dataset and can generate
synthetic samples that are differentailly private with respect to the private training dataset. We also
design a a differentially private gradient aggregator that works for continuous gradient vectors.
3 Scalable Differentially Private Generative Student Model via PATE
3.1 Model Overview
In this paper, we present a novel approach G-PATE for training differentially private data generator.
Figure 1 presents the overview of the approach. Different from PATE-GAN and DP-GAN, G-PATE
ensures differential privacy for the information flow from the discriminator to the generator. This
improvement incurs less utility loss on the synthetic samples, so G-PATE can generate synthetic
samples for higher dimensional and more complex datasets.
G-PATE makes two major modifications on the training process of GAN. First, we replace the
discriminator in GAN with an ensemble of teacher discriminators trained on disjoint subsets of
the sensitive data. The teacher discriminators do not need to be published, so they can be trained
with non-private algorithms. In addition, we design a gradient aggregator to collect information
from teacher discriminators and combine them in a differentially private fashion. The output of the
aggregator is a gradient vector that guides the student generator to improve its synthetic samples.
Unlike PATE-GAN, G-PATE does not require any student discriminator. The teacher discriminators
are directly connected to the student generator. The gradient aggregator sanitizes the information
flow from the teacher discriminators to the student generator to ensure differential privacy. This way,
G-PATE is able to better use privacy budget and approximate the real data distribution to ensure high
data utility.
3
3.2 Training the Student Generator
The major difference between G-PATE and prior work is the training procedure for the generator.
To better use privacy budget, G-PATE only ensures differential privacy for the generator and allows
the discriminator to learn private information. The privacy property is achieved by sanitizing all
information propagated from the discriminators to the generator.
For the convenience of privacy analysis, we separate G-PATE into three parts: the teacher discrim-
inators, the student generator, and the gradient aggregator. To prevent the propagation of private
information, the student generator does not have direct access to any information in any of the teacher
discriminators. Consequently, we cannot train the student generator by ascending its gradient on the
discriminators’ loss.
To solve this problem, we propose the use of adversarial perturbation, which is a small manipulation
on the fake record x that causes the discriminator’s loss on x to increase. The adversarial perturbation
is calculated by ascending x’s gradients on the loss of the discriminator. It teaches the student
generator how to improve its fake records.
In each training iteration, the student generator is updated in three steps: (1) A teacher discriminator
generates adversarial perturbations for each record produced by the student generator. (2) The gradient
aggregator takes the adversarial perturbations from all teacher models and generates a differentially
private aggregation of them. (3) The student generator updates its weights based on the privately
aggregated adversarial perturbation. The process is formally presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 - Training the Student Generator. The student generator is jointly trained with an
ensemble of teacher discriminators. In each iteration, the student generator updates its weights based
on an aggregated adversarial perturbation generated by the teacher ensemble.
Require: batch size m, number of teacher models n, gradient aggregator Agg, disjoint subsets of
sensitive data d1, d2, . . . , dn
1: for number of training iterations do
2: Sample m noise samples {z1, z2, . . . , zm}
3: Generate fake samples {G(z1), G(z2), . . . , G(zm)}
4: for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
5: Sample m data samples {x1, x2, . . . , xm} from di
6: Update the teacher discriminator Di by descending its stochastic gradient on LDi on both
fake samples and real samples
7: for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} do
8: Calculate the adversarial perturbation ∆x(i)j as xj’s gradients on LDi(xj)
9: end for
10: end for
11: for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} do
12: ∆xj ← DPGradAgg(∆x(1)j ,∆x(2)j , . . . ,∆x(n)j )
13: xˆj ← G(zj) + ∆xj
14: end for
15: Update the student generator G by descending its stochastic gradient on LG on
{xˆ1, xˆ2, . . . , xˆm}
16: end for
Generating Adversarial Perturbations. Let D be a teacher discriminator. Given a fake record x,
we use LD(x) to represent D’s loss on x. In each training iteration, the weights of D are updated by
descending their stochastic gradients on LD.
For each input fake record x, we generate an adversarial perturbation ∆x that guides the student
generator on improving its output. By applying the perturbation on its output, the student generator
would get an improved fake record xˆ = x + ∆x on which D has higher loss. Therefore, ∆x is
calculated as x’s gradients on LD:
∆x =
∂LD(a)
∂a
∣∣∣∣
a=x
. (1)
4
With the adversarial perturbation ∆x, the student generator can be trained without direct access to
the discriminator’s loss.
Updating the Student Generator. A student generator G learns to map a random input z to a
fake record x = G(z) so that x is indistinguishable from a real record by D. Given an adversarial
perturbation ∆x, the teacher discriminators have higher loss on the perturbed fake record xˆ = x+∆x
compared to the original fake record x. Therefore, the student generator learns to improve its fake
records by minimizing mean squared loss (MSE) between its output G(z) and the perturbed fake
record xˆ.
LG(z, xˆ) = 1
k
k∑
i=1
(G(z)i − xˆi)2. (2)
To ensure differential privacy, instead of receiving the adversarial perturbation from a single discrim-
inator, the student generator is trained with an ensemble of teacher discriminators. In section 3.3,
we present a differentially private gradient aggregator that combines adversarial perturbations from
multiple teacher discriminators.
3.3 Differentially Private Gradient Aggregation for G-PATE
G-PATE consists of a student generator and an ensemble of teacher discriminators trained on disjoint
subsets of the sensitive data. In each training iteration, each teacher discriminator generates an
adversarial perturbation ∆x that guides the student generator on improving its output records.
Different from traditional GAN, in G-PATE, the student generator does not have access to the loss
of any teacher discriminators, and the adversarial perturbation is the only information propagated
from the teacher discriminators to the student generator. Therefore, to achieve differential privacy, it
suffices to add noise during the aggregation of the adversarial perturbations.
However, the aggregators used in PATE and PATE-GAN are not suitable for aggregating gradient
vectors because they are only applicable to categorical data. Therefore, we propose a differentially
private gradient aggregator (DPGradAgg) based on PATE. With gradient discretisation, we convert
gradient aggregation into a voting problem and get the noisy aggregation of teachers’ votes using
PATE. Additionally, we use random projection to reduce the dimension of vectors on which the
aggregation is performed. The combination of these two approaches allows G-PATE to generate
synthetic samples with higher data utility, even for large scale image datasets, which is hard to be
achieved by PATE-GAN. The algorithm is formally presented in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 - Differentially Private Gradient Aggregator (DPGradAgg). This algorithm takes a
list of gradient vectors and returns a differentially private aggregation of them.
Require: gradient vectors {∆x(1),∆x(2), . . . ,∆x(n)}, gradient clipping constant c, number of bins
B, projected dimension k ,noise parameters σ1 and σ2, threshold T
1: k0 ← the dimension of ∆x(1)
2: R ← a random projection matrix of size (k0, k) with each component randomly drawn from
N (0, 1k )
3: {∆u(1),∆u(2), . . . ,∆u(n)} ← {∆x(1)R,∆x(2)R, . . . ,∆x(n)R}
4: ∆u← empty list
5: for j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , k do
6: v ← a vector containing the jth element of all gradients in {∆u(1),∆u(2), . . . ,∆u(n)}
7: Clip v to (−c, c)
8: h← the histogram of v with B bins of width 2cB
9: j ← Confident-GNMax(h, σ1, σ2, T )
10: Append the midpoint of the j-th bin to ∆u
11: end for
12: ∆x← ∆uRT
13: return ∆x
Gradient Discretisation. Since PATE is originally designed for aggregating the teacher models’
votes on the correct class label of an example, the aggregation algorithm in PATE only applies to
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categorical data. Therefore, we design a three-step algorithm to apply PATE on continuous gradient
vectors. First, we discretize the gradient vector by creating a histogram and mapping each element
to the midpoint of the bin it belongs to. Then, instead of voting for the class labels as in PATE, a
teacher discriminator votes for k bins associated with k elements in its gradient vector. Finally, for
each dimension, we calculate the bin with most votes using the Confident-GNMax aggregator [21]
(Appendix C). The aggregated gradient vector is consisted of the midpoints of the selected bins.
With gradient discretisation, the teacher discriminators can directly communicate with the student
generator using the PATE mechanism. Since these teacher discriminators are trained on real data,
they can provide much better guidance to the generator compared to the student discriminator in
PATE-GAN, which is only trained on synthetic samples. Moreover, the Confident-GNMax aggregator
ensures that the student generator would only improve its output in the direction agreed by most of
the teacher discriminators.
Random Projection. Aggregation on high dimensional vectors is expensive in terms of privacy
budget because private voting needs to be performed on each dimension of the vectors. To save
privacy budget, we use random projection [3] to reduce the dimensionality of gradient vectors. Before
the aggregation, we generate a random projection matrix with each component randomly drawn from
a Gaussian distribution. We then project the gradient vector to a lower dimension space with the
random projection matrix. After the aggregation, the aggregated gradient vector is projected back
to its original dimensions. Since the generation of random projection matrix is data-independent. It
does not consume any privacy budgets.
Random projection is shown to be especially effective on image datasets. Since different pixels of an
image are often highly correlated, the intrinsic dimensionality of an image is usually much lower
than the number of pixels [13]. Therefore, random projection maximizes the amount of information
a student generator can get from a single query to the Confident-GNMax aggregator, and makes it
possible for G-PATE to retain reasonable utility even on high dimensional data. Moreover, random
projection forces G-PATE to focus more on the general features of an image rather than minor details,
therefore is beneficial to privacy protection both theoretically and empirically.
3.4 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we analyze the privacy guarantee for G-PATE. To start with, we propose the following
definition for a differentially private data generator.
Definition 1 (Differentially Private Data Generator). Let G be a data generator that maps a point in
the noise space Z to a point in the data space X , and let D be the training dataset of G. We say that
G is an (ε, δ)-differentially private data generator if for all z ∈ Z, the synthetic record x = G(z) is
(ε, δ)-differentially private with respect to D.
A differentially private data generator is ensured not to memorize individual records in its training
dataset, and synthetic records produced by a differentially private data generator would leak little
private information in the training dataset.
Theorem 1. Given a sensitive dataset D and a parameter 0 < δ < 1, let G be the student generator
trained by Algorithm 1. There exists ε > 0 so that G is an (ε, δ)-differentially private data generator.
During the training process, the student generator can only access information about the sensitive
dataset through the Confident-GNMax Aggregator. Therefore, Theorem 1 is a consequence of
combining the privacy guarantee for Confident-GNMax (Appendix C) and the post processing
property of differential privacy [10]. We present a formal analysis on the data-dependent privacy
budget ε in Appendix C.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate G-PATE against two state-of-art benchmarks: DP-GAN and PATE-GAN.
To compare the performance of different data generators, we train a classification model on the
synthetic data and test the model on real data. We evaluate the quality of the synthetic data as the
predictive performance based on the classification model trained on it.
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GAN PATE-GAN DP-GAN G-PATE
Logistic Regression 0.8950 0.8728 0.8720 0.9251
AdaBoost [11] 0.9143 0.8959 0.8809 0.8981
Bagging [4] 0.8951 0.8877 0.8657 0.8964
Multi-layer Perceptron 0.9086 0.8925 0.8787 0.9093
Average 0.9034 0.8871 0.8743 0.9072
Table 1: Performance Comparison on Kaggle Credit Dataset. The table presents AUROC of
classification models trained on synthetic data and tested on real data. The evaluation results for GAN,
PATE-GAN, and DP-GAN are recorded in [27]. We evaluate G-PATE under the same experimental
setup. PATE-GAN, DP-GAN, and G-PATE all satisfy (1, 10−5)-differential privacy. The best results
among different DP generative models are bolded.
We first perform comparative analysis with PATE-GAN and DP-GAN on the datasets used in the
corresponding works (i.e., Kaggle credit dataset and MNIST dataset). Additionally, we evaluate
G-PATE on the Fashion-MNIST dataset consisting of real-world images of clothes.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets. To compare with PATE-GAN, we use the Kaggle credit card fraud detection dataset [6]
(Kaggle Credit) which is the primary dataset used in [27] 1. The dataset contains 284,807 samples
representing transactions made by European cardholders’ credit cards in September 2013, and 492
(0.2) of these samples are fraudulent transactions. Each sample consists of 29 continuous features
which are the results of a PCA transformation from the original features.
To demonstrate that our proposed G-PATE is scalable for high dimension image datasets while
PATE-GAN is limited without evaluating them, we train G-PATE on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST
datasets. The MNIST and Fashion-MNIST dataset [25] each consists of 60,000 training examples
and 10,000 testing examples. Each example is a 28× 28 grayscale image, associated with a label
from 10 classes. The examples in the MNIST dataset are images of handwritten digits between 0 and
9, and the examples in the Fashion-MNIST dataset are real-world images of clothes taken from the
Zalando articles. Fashion-MNIST is proposed as a replacement for the MNIST dataset because it
better represents modern CV tasks.
G-PATE. For Kaggle Credit dataset, both student generator and discriminator are fullly connected
neural network with the same structure as PATE-GAN [27]. We use randomly projection with 5
projected dimensions during gradient aggregation. We use the DCGAN [24] structure on both MNIST
and Fashion-MNIST. We apply randomly projection with 10 projected dimensions during gradient
aggregation. Appendix D lists detailed structures and hyperparameters of the models2.
4.2 Comparative Analysis with DP-GAN and PATE-GAN
Kaggle Credit. The Kaggle Credit dataset is highly unbalanced. In PATE-GAN, the ratio between
positive and negative classes in the sensitive training set is assumed to be public information. On
the contrary, we do not rely on any public information about the sensitive training dataset. Instead,
we calculate the ratio between positive and negative classes using Laplacian mechanism [10] with
ε = 0.01. Then, we train a (0.99, 10−5)-differentially private data generator and sample the synthetic
records according to the noisy class ratios. By the composition theorem of differential privacy [10],
the data generation mechanism is (1, 10−5)-differentially private.
To compare with the performance of PATE-GAN, we select 4 commonly used classifiers evaluated
in [27]. The performance of a generator is measured by the AUROC of the 4 classifiers trained
on the corresponding synthetic data. We evaluate G-PATE under the same experimental setups as
PATE-GAN for ε = 1.3 The evaluation results for GAN, PATE-GAN, and DP-GAN are recorded
from [27].
1PATE-GAN does not open source, so we directly compare with the results they reported.
2The source code is available in supplementary materials.
3We reproduce the experimental setups of PATE-GAN to the best of our knowledge according to the paper.
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Dataset GAN DP-GAN G-PATE
MNIST 0.9653 (ε =∞) 0.4036 (ε = 1) 0.5631 (ε = 1)
0.8011 (ε = 10) 0.8092 (ε = 10)
Fashion-MNIST 0.8032 (ε =∞) 0.1053 (ε = 1) 0.5174 (ε = 1)
0.6098 (ε = 10) 0.6934 (ε = 10)
Table 2: Performance Comparison on Image Datasets. We compare G-PATE with DP-GAN and
GAN on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST dataset. The table presents the 10-class classification accuracy
of a model trained on synthetic data and tested on real data. DP-GAN and G-PATE are both evaluated
under two private settings: ε = 1, δ = 10−5 and ε = 10, δ = 10−5.
Figure 2: Visualization of generated instances by G-PATE. Row 1 (ε = 10, δ = 10−5) and row 2
(ε = 1, δ = 10−5) each presents one image from each class (digits 0-9). When ε = 1, G-PATE does
not generate high-quality images. However, it preserves partial features in the training images, so the
synthetic images are still useful.
Table 1 presents the comparative analysis between G-PATE and PATE-GAN on Kaggle Credit dataset.
G-PATE outperforms both PATE-GAN and DP-GAN and has comparative performance with the
original GAN which has no privacy protection. The good performance of G-PATE is partly due to the
relatively low dimension of the Kaggle Credit dataset and the abundance of training examples. Since
adversarial perturbations have the same shape as synthetic records, the gradient aggregator consumes
less privacy budgets on low dimensional records and the random projection mechanism incurs little
utility loss. More experimental results on Kaggle Credit dataset are presented in Appendix A.
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. To understand G-PATE’s performance on image datasets, we per-
form comparative analysis between G-PATE and DP-GAN on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST dataset4.
We evaluate the generator by the 10-class classification accuracy of models trained on synthetic
data and tested on real data (Table 2). The analysis is performed under two performance settings:
ε = 1, δ = 10−5 and ε = 10, δ = 10−5. G-PATE outperforms DP-GAN under both settings, and
there is a more significant improvement for the setting with stronger privacy guarantee (i.e., ε = 1).
Specifically, we observe that DP-GAN fails to converge on the Fashion-MNIST dataset with ε = 1.
The synthetic records generated by DP-GAN under this setting are close to random noise while the
model trained on G-PATE generated data retains an accuracy of 51.74%.
Analysis on the Number of Teachers. G-PATE benefits from having more teacher discriminators
because, with more teachers, the noise added to the votes will have less influence on the final results.
However, this benefits diminishes as the training set for each teacher model gets smaller with the
increasing number of teachers. Appendix B presents a quantitative analysis on the results.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes G-PATE, a novel approach of training a differentially private data generator
by ensuring privacy property on the information flow from the discriminator to generator in GAN.
G-PATE is enabled by a differentially private gradient aggregation mechanism combined with random
projection. It significantly outperforms prior work on both image and non-image datasets. Moreover,
G-PATE reatins reasonable utility on more complex image dataset for which DP-GAN can hardly
converge.
4We are unable perform comparative study with PATE-GAN on image datasets because PATE-GAN does not
report any results on images.
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Appendix A. Additional Evaluation Results on Kaggle Credit Dataset
In addition to AUROC, we also evaluate the AUPRC of the classification models trained on the
synthetic data produced by different generative models. Table 3 presents the results. G-PATE has the
best performance among all the differentially private generative models.
GAN PATE-GAN DP-GAN G-PATE
Logistic Regression (LR) 0.4069 0.3907 0.3923 0.4476
AdaBoost 0.4530 0.4366 0.4234 0.4481
Bagging 0.3303 0.3221 0.3073 0.3503
Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) 0.4790 0.4693 0.4600 0.5109
Average 0.4173 0.4046 0.3958 0.4392
Table 3: AUPRC on Kaggle Credit Dataset. The table presents AUPRC of classification models
trained on synthetic data and tested on real data. PATE-GAN, DP-GAN, and G-PATE all satisfy
(1, 10−5)-differential privacy. The best results among different DP generative models are bolded.
To understand the upper-bound of the classification models’ performance. We train the same
classification models on real data and test it on real data. The results are presented in Table 4.
LR AdaBoost Bagging MLP
AUROC 0.9330 0.9802 0.9699 0.9754
AUPRC 0.6184 0.7103 0.6707 0.8223
Table 4: Performance of Classification Models Trained on Real Data. The table presents AUROC
and AUPRC of classification models trained and tested on real data. These results are the upper-
bounds for evaluation results on Kaggle Credit dataset.
Appendix B. Analysis on the Number of Teacher Models
Table 5 presents the 10-class classification accuracy for models trained on synthetic data produced
by G-PATE with different number of teachers. For 2000 teachers, we set σ1 = 1700, σ2 = 1000
and use 5 project dimensions for random projection. We use 10 project dimensions for both 3000
and 4000 teachers. We set σ1 = 2000, σ2 = 1000 for 3000 teachers, and σ1 = 3000, σ2 = 1000 for
4000 teachers. It is shown that more teacher models will help improve the data utility while 4000
teacher models have already achieved satisfiable results.
Number of Teacher Models 2000 3000 4000
MNIST 0.4240 0.5218 0.5631
Fashion-MNIST 0.3997 0.4874 0.5174
Table 5: Analysis on the Number of Teacher Models. The best results are bolded.
Appendix C. Privacy Analysis
In this section, we analyze the data dependent privacy budget ε for training G-PATE.
For completeness of the paper, we recall the Confident-GNMax aggregator proposed in scalable
PATE [21] in Algorithm 3.
We start with recalling the definition of differential privacy (DP), Rényi differential privacy (RDP),
and some of their properties.
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Algorithm 3 Confident-GNMax Aggregator. The private aggregator used in the scalable PATE
framework [21].
Require: input x, threshold T , noise parameters σ1 and σ2
1: if maxi{nj(x)}+N (0, σ21) ≥ T then
2: return arg max{nj(x) +N (0, σ22)}
3: else
4: return ⊥
5: end if
Definition 2 ((ε, δ)-Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithmM with domain N|X | is (ε, δ)-
differentially private if for all S ⊆ Range(M) and for any neighboring datasets D and D′:
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
Definition 3 ((λ, ε)−RDP). A randomized mechanism M is said to guarantee (λ, ε)-RDP with
λ ≥ 1 if for any neighboring datasets D and D′,
Dλ (M(D)‖M (D′)) = 1
λ− 1 logEx∼M(D)
[(
Pr[M(D) = x]
Pr [M (D′) = x]
)λ−1]
≤ ε.
RDP allows tighter composition of heterogeneous mechanisms and can be converted to (ε, δ)-
differential privacy [19].
Theorem 2 (Composition of RDP [19]). If a mechanismM consists of a sequnce ofM1, . . . ,M)k
such that for any i ∈ [k],Mi guarantees (λ, εi)-RDP, thenM guarantees (λ,
∑k
i=1 εi)-RDP.
Theorem 3 (From RDP to DP [19]). If a mechanismM guarantees (λ, ε)-RDP, thenM guarantees
(ε+ log 1/δλ−1 , δ)-differential privacy for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
We first analyze the privacy guarantee for a single query to the Confident-GNMax aggregator. A
Confident-GNMax aggregator consists of two steps. First, it computes the noisy maximum votes
M1 = max
i
{nj(x)}+N (0, σ21).
Then, it uses the GNMax mechanism to select the output with most votes:
M2 = arg max{nj(x) +N (0, σ22)}.
Theorem 4 presents the data dependent privacy guarantee for the GNMax aggregator M2.
Theorem 4 (Data Dependent Privacy Bound for GNMax Mechanism [21]). If the top three vote
counts are n1 > n2 > n3 and n1 − n2, n2 − n3  σ, then the mechanism GNMax with Gaussian of
variance σ2 satisfies (λ, exp(−2λ/σ2)/λ-RDP for λ = (n1 − n2)/4.
Additionally, we analyze the data independent privacy guarantee for the noisy maximum votes
mechanism M1.
Theorem 5. The maximum noisy votes mechanism with Gaussian of variatnce σ2 guarantees
(λ, λ/2σ2)-RDP for all λ > 1.
Proof. Since each teacher model may cause the maximum number of votes to change at most by
1. The maximum noisy votes mechanism is equivalent to a Gaussian mechanism with sensitivity 1.
Hence, it satisfies (λ, λ/2σ2)-RDP [19].
Since a student generator can only access information about the sensitive data through the Confident-
GNMax aggregator, the privacy budget for training the student generator is the composition of privacy
budgets across multiple runs of the aggregator.
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Appendix D. Model Structures and Hyperparmeters
G-PATE. For MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, the student generator consists of a fully connected
layer with 1024 units and a deconvolutional layer with 64 kernels of size 5× 5 (strides 2× 2). Each
teacher discriminator has a convolutional layer with 32 kernels of size 5 × 5 (strides 2 × 2) and a
fully connected layer with 256 units. All layers are concated with the one-hot encoded class label.
We apply batch normalization and Leaky ReLU on all layers. When ε = 10, we train 2000 teacher
discriminators with batch size of 30 and set σ1 = 600, σ2 = 100. When ε = 1, we train 4000 teacher
discriminators with batch size of 15 and set σ1 = 3000, σ2 = 1000. For Kaggle Credit dataset, we
train 2100 teacher discriminators with batch size of 32 and set σ1 = 1500, σ2 = 600. For all three
datasets, we use Adam optimizer [15] with learning rate of 10−3 to train the models and clip the
adversarial perturbations between ±10−4. The consensus threshold T is set to 0.5.
GAN. The structure of GAN is the same as the structure of G-PATE with a single teacher discrimi-
nator. The hyper-parameters are also the same as G-PATE.
DP-GAN. We use DP-GAN method mentioned in [26] on both MNIST and FashionMNIST tasks.
For the generator, we use FC Net structure with [128, 256, 512, 784] neurons in each layer, and the
discriminator contains [784, 64, 64, 1] neurons in each layer. In each training epoch, the discriminator
trains 5 steps and the generator trains 1 step. For both networks, 0.5 × ReLU(·) activation layers
are used. Our batch size is 64 for each sampling, and sampling rate q equals to 646×104 . We bound
the discriminator’s parameter weights to [−0.1, 0.1] and kept feature’s value between [−0.5, 0.5]
during the forward process. In order to generate specific digit data, we concat one-hot vector, which
represents digits categories, into each layer in both the disciminator and the generator.
Classification Models for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. For each synthetic dataset, we trian a
CNN for the classification task. The model has two convolutional layers with 32 and 64 kernels
respectively. We use ReLU as the activation function and applies dropout on all layers.
Classification Models for Kaggle Credit. We implement 4 predictive models in [27] using sklearn:
Logistic Regression (LogisticRegression), Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoostClassifier), Boot-
strap Aggregating (BaggingClassifier) and Multi-layer Perceptron (MLPClassifier). We use
L1 penalty, Liblinear solver and (350:1) class weight in Logistic Regression. We use logistic
regression as classifier in Adaptive Boosting and Bootstrap Aggregating, setting L2 penalty, number
of teachers as 200 and 100. For Multi-layer Perceptron, we use tanh as the activation of 3 layers
with 18 nodes and Adam as the optimizer.
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